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Abstract
We perform an empirical analysis to investigate the relationship between income inequality and the
occurrence of banking crises on a panel of 33 advanced countries in the period 1970-2011. As opposed
to other empirical studies, we focus on levels rather than growth rates of income inequality. We find a
statistically significant and positive relationship between the value of the Gini index and the probability
of banking crises. This result is confirmed when income distribution is summarized by the top 1% income
share.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, it has been claimed by some prominent scholars that income inequality may be responsible
for financial crises. This point of view is well summarized in the influential book by Rajan (2010, p. 43),
according to whom “growing economic inequality in the United States led to political pressures for more
housing credit. This pressure created a serious fault line that distorted lending in the financial sector”.
While the argument is not fully new (see Galbraith , 1954, for instance), other researchers (e.g., Krugman,
2007, Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2009 and Stiglitz, 2012, among others) have endorsed what is now referred to
as the “Rajan hypothesis”, linking income inequality to the surge in household indebtedness which has been
found to be a major predictor of banking crises.1
The hypothesis put forward by Rajan and other scholars has triggered a vigorous debate (see the ex-
haustive and updated surveys by Van Treeck, 2014 and Bazillier and Hericourt, 2017), and a relatively small
group of studies have tried to investigate empirically the relationship between income inequality and the
occurrence of banking or financial crises. We aim at participating to this growing debate by means of an
econometric analysis that tests the link between levels of income inequality and the probability of banking
crises. Differently from other scholars (see in particular Bordo and Meissner, 2012 and Perugini, Ho¨lscher
and Collie, 2016) we test this link directly. Our study encompasses a panel of 33 advanced countries in the
period 1970-2011. The main finding of our paper is that the level of gross income inequality (measured by
either the Gini index or the top 1% income share) is positively associated with the occurrence of banking
crises. Furthermore, we find that the effect of an increase in the level of income inequality is relatively large
in economic terms. In addition, the effect seems to be larger for countries that already have an elevated
level of income inequality. Finally, the results hold for a series of robustness checks, such as the exclusion of
various country groups.
There are several reasons to claim that the relevant measure of income inequality is the level and not
the growth rate when investigating if there is an association between income inequality and the likelihood of
banking crises. First of all, the theoretical literature by Iacoviello (2008) and Kumhof, Ranciere and Winant
(2015) emphasizes the existence of a long-run relation between household debt and income inequality. As
a consequence, the use of the growth rate of income inequality that removes the long-run trend as in the
studies by Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016) seems problematic.
In fact, using the growth rate of income inequality will lead to biased estimates if a long-run relation exists
between income inequality and household debt as emphasized by Klein (2015). Iacoviello (2008) argues that
1See also Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016). Iacoviello (2008) shows that in the U. S. the prolonged rise of the
1980s and the 1990s in household debt can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in income inequality.
See also Roy and Kemme (2012).
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short-term movements in household debt can be explained by business cycle fluctuations while the connection
between household debt and income inequality is a long-term one. Klein (2015) uses panel cointegration
techniques, and shows that a long-run relation exists between income inequality and household debt. This
result is consistent with Malinen (2016), who also finds a long-run steady-state relationship between the top
1% income share and domestic bank credit. In short, both the theoretical and empirical literature emphasize
that income inequality is related to household debt only in the long-run, which implies that the level of
income inequality (rather than the growth rate) is the suitable measure in this study.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and places our analysis in
perspective with respect to other empirical studies. Section 3 describes the dataset and variables. In Section
4 we provide a description of our empirical approach and the statistical model (4.1) followed by a discussion
of our findings (4.2) and their robustness (4.3). Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The first paper that investigates directly the relationship between income inequality and banking crises is
Atkinson and Morelli (2011). Their approach is purely descriptive and focusses on the presence of a link
between increases in income disparity (as measured by the Gini index as well as the top 1% income share) and
the occurrence of banking crises in 25 countries between 1911 and 2010. They fail to detect any meaningful
link between increases in income inequality before the occurrence of banking crises and the occurrence itself.
A similar conclusion is reached by Bordo and Meissner (2012) in a paper which became a benchmark for
the subsequent literature. They test the Rajan hypothesis for a sample of 14 advanced countries between
1870 and 2008 and find that a credit boom increases the probability of a banking crisis.2 However, they
cannot detect any evidence that a rise in top income shares accelerate the boom. The strategy employed
by Bordo and Meissner consists in investigating whether credit growth influences the likelihood of banking
crises, and then verifying if a change in income inequality is associated with higher credit growth. In the first
step, logit and OLS estimations are conducted with a binary banking crisis dependent variable and lagged
real credit growth as independent variable. They show that credit growth in the previous two to five years is
strongly and positively associated to a crisis. In the second step, the top 1% income share is regressed against
cumulative growth in credit during the previous five-year period. They reject any relationship between credit
growth and the growth in top income share.
Gu and Huang (2014) use data similar to Bordo and Meissner (2012), but reach different results, possibly
because cross-section heterogeneity is taken into account by including countries that can be considered to be
2A similar conclusion is reached by Schularick and Taylor (2012). Using a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the
years 1870-2008, they conclude that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises.
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outliers. Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016) perform logit estimations to investigate the existence
of a direct link between changes in top income share and the likelihood of banking crises. Again, the
primary dataset is the same as Bordo and Meissner (2012). The year-on-year change in income inequality is
found to have some predictive power both in-sample and out-of-sample. Income inequality turns out to have
substantial predictive power over and above credit booms and has a distinct role as a driver of financial crises
that remains when controlling for credit growth. These results suggest that the empirical strategy employed
by Bordo and Meissner might be unsuitable to detect the link between income inequality and banking crises.
Bellettini and Delbono (2013) were the first ones to investigate directly the “level” hypothesis to see
whether persistently high levels of Gini values in income distribution relate to banking crises. The quantita-
tive analysis is descriptive and the association seems weak, although non-negligible. They make a remark on
the geography of such association (see also Atkinson and Morelli (2015, p. 49)) to stress that its assessment
should be primarily focused on the crisis-originator countries (e.g., US and UK for the 2008 banking crises)
where the link between growing income inequality and banking crises seems pretty robust (see, for instance,
Gu and Huang, 2014).
Atkinson and Morelli (2015) test statistically both the “growth” and the “level” hypothesis relying on
an updated version of their previous database (Atkinson and Morelli, 2014). The authors find no clear-
cut conclusion for the relationship between growing or high levels of economic inequality (summarized by
different indexes) and the occurrence of banking crises in the period 2000-2012.
Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) also test the “level” hypothesis by means of an econometric analysis
where high levels of top income shares are shown to be robustly correlated to private sector indebtedness
which in turn is a significant predictor of systemic banking risk.3 The econometric analysis is performed
on a panel of 18 OECD countries for the years 1970-2007. They explicitly take into account endogeneity
and reverse causation issues by using IV and GMM-sys methodology. As in Bordo and Meissner’s paper,
private sector credit is found to be a significant predictor of financial crises. However, it is worth stressing
that Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) do not investigate the presence of a direct link between income
inequality and financial crises that is not explained by credit growth.
As for the choice of credit measures, Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) consider both household and
corporate credit, but try to control for this by including investment as a percentage of GDP. This is the same
route followed by Bordo and Meissner (2012). However, notice that retained profits are also often used to
finance investments, which implies that the ratio between investments and GDP may be a suboptimal proxy
for credit. The main features of the above mentioned literature are summarized in Table 1 below.
3Klein (2015) detects a long-run relationship between income inequality and household debt. He uses different measures of
income inequality for 9 advanced countries in the period 1953-2008 and finds that inequality and leverage are cointegrated.
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Table 1: Main features of some related empirical papers
Atkinson
and
Morelli
(2011)
Bordo and
Meissner
(2012)
Bellettini
and Del-
bono
(2013)
Gu and
Huang
(2014)
Atkinson
and
Morelli
(2015)
Perugini,
Ho¨lscher
and Collie
(2016)
Kirschen-
mann,
Mali-
nen and
Nyberg
(2016)
Period 1911-2010 1928-2008 1980-2010 1928-2008 1900-2012 1970-2007 1870-2008
Number
of coun-
tries
25 14 ad-
vanced
countries
14 or 18 14 ad-
vanced
countries
25 18 OECD
countries
14 ad-
vanced
countries
Measure
of income
inequality
Gini and
top 1%
income
share
Top 1%
income
share
Gini Top 1%
income
share
Many Top in-
come
shares
Top 1%
income
share
Growth or
Levels
Growth Growth Levels Growth Growth
and Levels
Levels Growth
Relationship
between
income
inequal-
ity and
banking
crises
Ambiguous Ambiguous Weak Strong in
Anglo-
saxon
countries
Ambiguous Strong∗ Strong
∗ Between income inequality and private sector indebtedness.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
The dataset consists of yearly data for 33 advanced countries during the period 1970-2011.4 A description
of variable definitions and sources is provided in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.5 Data on the binary
variable banking crisis has been compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2013). The authors define a banking crisis
as an event that meets two conditions: “(1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as
indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations). (2) Significant
banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and
Valencia, 2013). Our dataset includes a total of 123 country-year banking crisis observations distributed
across 33 banking crisis episodes.
The income inequality measures are the Gini index and the top 1% income share before taxes and trans-
fers. Data on the gross Gini index have been collected from the Standardized World Income Inequality
4The list of countries is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
5The control variables shown in Tables A1 and A2 were constructed using data from the World Bank Databank, International
Financial Statistics (IMF), BIS total credit statistics, Economic Freedom of the World Database (Fraser institute) and OECD.
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Database (SWIID) compiled by Solt (2016). The latest version of the SWIID database contains two collec-
tions of Gini indexes. The first one consists of the gross income inequality series from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) database. The second collection includes data from national statistical offices, cross-national
income inequality databases, and academic articles (Solt, 2016).
Data for the top 1% income share before taxes and transfers have been collected from the World Top
Incomes Database (WTID) which is based on historical income tax records. Accurate information about
measures such as the mean household income is necessary to compute the Gini index. These measures
can be unreliable since they are based on data affected by country-dependent inconsistencies (Kirschen-
mann, Malinen and Nyberg, 2016). However, the top 1% income share measure is computed using the same
procedure and raw data for all countries (Piketty, 2007). In addition, data for the top 0.1%, 5% and 10%
income shares is exploited to perform robustness tests.
Other related papers used disposable (or after tax) income to compute Gini indexes and/or top income
shares. Our choice of gross incomes seems reasonable for at least three reasons. First, data on net income
shares over time are currently very limited. Similarly, data on net Gini indexes are also limited relative to
the gross ones. Finally, gross and net income shares tend to mimic similar developments in the distribution
of income (see Malinen, 2016, p. 312, fn. 3).
Figure 1 illustrates the average gross (or market) Gini index and the top 1% income share over the
period 1970-2011 for 33 advanced countries. The general trend for both measures of income inequality is
characterized by a steady increase since the 1980s.
The behavior of the average Gini index, the top 1% income share and the ratio of household credit to
GDP around a banking crisis episode is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows that the level of the
Gini index (average for 27 advanced countries) is higher at the beginning of the banking crisis (vertical line)
than during the previous 15 years. Moreover, the top 1% income share (average for 14 advanced countries)
is also at its peak on the eve of the crisis compared to the preceding years as shown in Figure 3.
Household credit (as a percentage of GDP) is included in these figures because the main theoretical
argument used to support the connection between income inequality and banking crises is based on the
expansion of household credit. The ratio of household credit to GDP (average for 21 advanced countries)
almost doubles during the 15 years before the banking crisis and then falls back to its previous level once
the crisis has started.
The United States is a “crisis originator” country and is an especially important case when investigating
the link between income inequality and banking crises. Figures 4 and 5 display the behavior of the average
Gini index, the top 1% income share and household credit (as a percentage of GDP) around the two banking
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Figure 1: Market Gini index and top 1% income share (average of 33 countries)
crises that started in 1988 and 2007 in the United States.6
Figure 4 shows that the Gini index was higher in the United States on the eve of the banking crisis
compared to a decade earlier. Moreover, the Gini index and the ratio of household credit to GDP tend to
move in tandem during the run-up to the crisis (the correlation is 0.83). Finally, the top 1% income share
doubled during the 15 years before the crisis and then dropped once the crisis started, as shown in Figure
5. The co-movement between the top 1% income share and household credit (as a percentage of GDP) in
the United States is even stronger than for the Gini index (the correlation is 0.92).
Descriptive statistics for the banking crisis variable, income inequality measures (Gini index and top
income share) and the control variables are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. It should be emphasized
that data availability for the Gini index is considerably larger than for the top income share. The average
value for the market Gini index is around 0.43 with a maximum of 0.58 for Hong Kong in 2002 and a
minimum of 0.245 for Latvia in 1990. The top 1% income share has a mean value of 0.09. The highest
6The control variables shown in Tables A1 and A2 were constructed using data from the World Bank Databank, International
Financial Statistics (IMF), BIS total credit statistics, Economic Freedom of the World Database (Fraser institute) and OECD.
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Figure 2: Gini index and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis
value (0.23) for the top 1 percent income share is observed in the United States in 2007, while Portugal had
the lowest value (0.04) in 1981. Finally, on average around one third of all gross income goes to the top 10
percent of income earners and one fourth of this amount is earned by the top 1 percent.
4 Empirical analysis
The empirical approach employed in this paper follows Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2005). We estimate
both a baseline and an extended specification using logit regressions. For all countries and years, the
binary dependent variable equals one if a banking crisis occurs and zero otherwise. The measures of income
inequality level (gross Gini index and the top 1% of gross income share) are lagged from one up to three
periods to avoid simultaneity issues. The baseline and extended specifications include a set of explanatory
variables that are commonly found in the literature to control for macroeconomic fundamentals, monetary
conditions and the global environment. More precisely, the baseline specification includes the real growth of
GDP, the change in terms of trade, depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, the real interest rate, inflation,
and GDP per capita. The extended specification instead includes all control variables of the baseline model,
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Figure 3: Top 1% income share and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis
but also the ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves, the ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP
and the lagged growth rate of domestic bank credit.
The macroeconomic fundamentals are real GDP growth, inflation and nominal depreciation. A slowdown
in GDP growth is likely to be associated with a banking crisis since lower economic growth negatively affects
banks balance sheets by increasing the share of non-performing loans. An elevated inflation rate may be a
sign of macroeconomic mismanagement which often precede banking crises (Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011).
In addition, banking crises have been found to often follow or coincide with currency crises. Consequently,
nominal depreciation is employed as a proxy for high volatility in the nominal exchange rate that typically
characterizes currency crises. However, even in the absence of a currency crisis, a nominal depreciation could
potentially cause a banking crisis due to foreign exchange risk (Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011). Finally, GDP
per capita (divided by one thousand to ease interpretation) is used as a proxy for institutional and economic
development (Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005).
Monetary conditions are proxied by the real interest rate in both the baseline and the extended specifi-
cation. An increase in the real interest rate is a proxy for a tightening of financial conditions which is likely
8
Figure 4: Gini index and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis (USA)
to squeeze banks balance sheets and increase the probability of a banking crisis (Duttagupta and Cashin,
2011).
The extended specification includes additional variables that are ignored in the baseline model. The ratio
of private sector bank credit to GDP is used as a measure of the size of financial markets and institutions
(financial deepness). Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) argue that excessive levels of credit are associated
with financial crises according to the literature and emphasize that the effect of stronger credit growth on
the probability of financial crises depends on the level of credit to GDP. The lagged growth rate of real
domestic credit is included as a proxy for credit booms that often precede banking crises (Schularick and
Taylor, 2012).
Another variable, added to the extended specification, is the ratio of broad money (M2) to foreign
exchange reserves. This variable measures a countrys vulnerability to currency crises which often coincide
with banking crises. This variable was divided by one thousand to ease interpretation.
The global environment is proxied by the change in terms of trade in both the baseline and the extended
specification. This variable has been divided by one trillion to ease interpretation of the coefficient. The
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Figure 5: Top 1% income share and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis (USA)
change in terms of trade is likely to affect GDP growth and consequently the stability of the banking sector
(Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011). Finally, the occurrence of a crisis is likely to affect the future path of the
explanatory variables, which would generate endogeneity issues. To mitigate this problem, five observations
are dropped after the first year of crisis, which implies that all crisis observations except the first year are
dropped. In addition, White-Huber robust standard errors clustered by country are used throughout the
paper except for the results presented in Tables A12-A13.
4.1 The statistical model
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the level of income inequality is associated with the
occurrence of banking crises. To this end, we model the probability of a banking crisis using a multivariate
logit model. Formally, let yit be a binary variable equal to 1 if a banking crisis occurs in country i during
year t, and 0 otherwise, and let xit be a vector of K explanatory variables. We assume that the probability
of observing a crisis depends on xit through the following expression:
Prob(yit = 1|xit) = piit(β) = 1
1 + exp (−x′itβ)
,
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where β is a vector of K unknown parameters to be estimated. The nonlinearity of the this expression
implies that, contrary to the linear regression model, the parameters β do not measure the effect on the
probability of a crisis of a change in one of the explanatory variables. Indeed, it is easy to check that for a
continuous explanatory variable xk,it the marginal effect on the probability of a crisis is given by:
∂Prob(yit = 1|xit)
∂xk,it
= piit(β)[1− piit(β)]βk,
where βk is the coefficient that multiplies xk,it in the definition of piit(β). Thus, unlike the linear regression
model, the marginal effect of a change in one of the regressors varies across the observations, and depends
on the original probabilities piit(β). In particular, the effect is shrunk to zero if the occurrence of a crisis
is either extremely unlikely (piit(β) ≈ 0) or extremely likely (piit(β) ≈ 1), and will be highest for values of
piit(β) close to 0.5. Note however that βk is informative on the sign of the marginal effect, as the shrinking
coefficient piit(β)[1− piit(β)] is positive by construction.
Given a sample of observations {(yit, xit), t = 1, 2, . . . , T, i = 1, 2, . . . , Nt}, the unknown parameters β
can be estimated by maximizing the sample loglikelihood function of the model:
logL(β) =
T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
[yit log piit(β) + (1− yit) log (1− piit(β))] .
Under suitable regularity conditions, and when the sample size grows to infinity, the resulting Maximum
Likelihood Estimator converges to the true value of β and is normally distributed. In samples of finite
size, its distribution will only be approximately Gaussian. Its variance matrix is readily provided by any
econometric package.
4.2 Results
If a higher level of gross income inequality is associated with the occurrence of banking crises, we would
expect the coefficients of the lagged Gini index to be positive and significant. The results displayed in Table
2 show that the coefficients of the Gini index have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. Moreover, the Gini coefficients are positive and highly significant for all lags in both
the baseline and the extended model. Consequently, the significance of the Gini index is not sensitive to the
specific choice of the number of lags or to the inclusion of measures of the level and growth rate of domestic
credit to the private sector.
The baseline estimation for the Gini index covers 33 countries and 24 crisis episodes for the period 1970-
2011. Due to data limitations for domestic credit and the ratio of M2 to international reserves, the extended
estimation includes 28 countries and 20 crisis episodes for the same period.
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Table 2: Results for logit estimations with Gini index, period 1970-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.181*** −0.177*** −0.177*** −0.265*** −0.274*** −0.257***
(0.0515) (0.0514) (0.0507) (0.0620) (0.0613) (0.0630)
totchange 0.0622*** 0.0613*** 0.0565*** 0.0845*** 0.0858*** 0.0813***
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0190)
depreciation −0.0739*** −0.0738*** −0.0736*** −0.0885*** −0.0884*** −0.0873***
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0196) (0.0206) (0.0214)
realinterest 0.0306 0.0416 0.0372 0.0616 0.0660 0.0488
(0.0743) (0.0752) (0.0724) (0.115) (0.119) (0.130)
inflation 0.0664 0.0743 0.0734 0.0311 0.0360 0.0116
(0.0621) (0.0624) (0.0597) (0.0574) (0.0557) (0.0594)
gdp pc 0.0293*** 0.0295*** 0.0285*** 0.0500*** 0.0507*** 0.0508***
(0.00856) (0.00878) (0.00897) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0122)
m2 reserves 0.0107 0.0107 0.0101
(0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0156)
credit gdp 0.0123** 0.0130** 0.0120**
(0.00505) (0.00533) (0.00549)
L2.credit growth 0.0175 0.0162 1.622
(0.0218) (0.0230) (2.552)
L.gini market 0.118*** 0.180***
(0.0390) (0.0586)
L2.gini market 0.118*** 0.188***
(0.0383) (0.0574)
L3.gini market 0.106*** 0.180***
(0.0379) (0.0550)
Observations 588 575 566 417 413 406
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 96.09 95.83 95.94 96.40 96.13 96.06
% Crises Correct 8.333 8.333 8.333 25 20 20
% No−Crises Correct 99.82 99.64 99.82 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.178 0.178 0.175 0.275 0.277 0.276
Chi−sq 35.72 35.44 34.75 44.16 44.28 43.96
p−value 8.20e−06 9.22e−06 1.25e−05 3.08e−06 2.93e−06 3.35e−06
AIC 180.8 180 179.9 138.4 137.8 137.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The Gini index is a useful measure of total income inequality in a country, but it can be integrated
with additional information. To this end, we can use the top 1% income share (before taxes and transfers)
similarly to Atkinson and Morelli (2015).
Table 3 shows the results for the baseline and extended estimations with the top 1% income share. The
coefficient multiplying the top 1% income share is positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level for the
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Table 3: Results for logit estimation with top 1% income share, period 1970-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.308*** −0.291*** −0.312*** −0.275*** −0.239** −0.264***
(0.105) (0.107) (0.0955) (0.0913) (0.101) (0.0833)
totchange 0.0630*** 0.0665*** 0.0198 0.0583*** 0.0651*** 0.0308
(0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0169) (0.0108) (0.0119) (0.0197)
depreciation −0.0689*** −0.0741*** −0.0588*** −0.0727*** −0.0813*** −0.0670***
(0.0176) (0.0156) (0.0165) (0.0224) (0.0220) (0.0254)
realinterest 0.0823 0.0839 0.0148 0.155 0.172 0.0804
(0.0684) (0.0762) (0.0767) (0.0998) (0.124) (0.142)
inflation −0.0692 −0.0651 −0.125* 0.0233 0.0359 −0.0405
(0.0761) (0.0790) (0.0749) (0.0863) (0.109) (0.117)
gdp pc 0.0369*** 0.0379*** 0.0241* 0.0426*** 0.0473*** 0.0330***
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0123) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0111)
m2 reserves 0.00229 −0.00249 0.000922
(0.0101) (0.0196) (0.0110)
credit gdp 0.0159* 0.0163* 0.0129*
(0.00826) (0.00912) (0.00776)
L2.credit growth −0.00640 −0.00698 3.298
(0.0198) (0.0229) (4.457)
L.topincomep99 12.82*** 19.55***
(4.289) (7.405)
L2.topincomep99 13.30*** 21.12**
(4.536) (8.334)
L3.topincomep99 4.077 12.10*
(5.271) (7.175)
Observations 408 402 392 324 321 317
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.57 96.52 96.17 96.30 96.26 95.90
% Crises Correct 6.667 6.667 0 14.29 14.29 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.195 0.202 0.145 0.223 0.238 0.178
Chi−sq 25.04 25.82 18.43 25.74 27.40 20.37
p−value 0.000748 0.000542 0.0102 0.00411 0.00225 0.0260
AIC 119.5 118.3 124.9 111.6 109.7 116.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
first and second. However, the top 1% income share is not significant at lag three in the baseline model, and
is only significant at the 10% level in the extended model.
Overall, these results suggest that a higher level of the top 1% income share is associated with a higher
probability of banking crises. This finding reinforces the results found for the Gini index, even though
statistical significance is generally weaker for the top 1% income share. The baseline model estimation is
13
based on a sample containing 15 banking crises in 19 countries, while the sample used to estimate the extended
model contains 14 banking crises distributed across 18 countries. Turning the attention to macroeconomic
fundamentals, we note that the coefficient of contemporaneous real GDP growth is negative and highly
significant in all estimations. This finding is consistent with Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and
suggests that lower GDP growth precede or coincide with the onset of banking crises. In addition, the
coefficient of GDP per capita is positive and significant.
The estimate of the inflation rate coefficient is positive but insignificant in Table 2, and insignificant with
a fluctuating sign in Table 6; this is different from Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), who find the
inflation rate coefficient to be positive and significant for 94 advanced and developing countries. It should
be emphasized that our paper only includes advanced countries for which the volatility of the inflation rate
is typically lower than for developing countries. Finally, the coefficient of nominal depreciation is found to
be negative and highly significant in all specifications.
Concerning monetary conditions, the real interest rate has a positive but insignificant coefficient in all
estimations reported in Tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, the estimates of the credit to GDP coefficient is
positive and significant in all specifications. This result is in line with the findings in Perugini, Ho¨lscher and
Collie (2016).
Among the global conditions, the coefficient of the change in terms of trade is estimated to be positive
and highly significant. Finally, the coefficient for the ratio of broad money (M2) to foreign exchange reserves
is insignificant in all estimations.
The results above clearly show that a higher level of income inequality is associated with a higher
probability of a banking crisis occurrence. The question is, how large is the effect of the level of income
inequality on the probability of a banking crisis. We follow the approach by Kirschenmann, Malinen and
Nyberg (2016) and calculate the average marginal effects for the Gini index and the top 1% income share.
Table 4 shows the average marginal effects of the Gini index and the top 1% income share for columns
1 and 4 in Tables 2 and 3. The average level of the Gini index for the extended model and the full sample
has a standard deviation of about 5.87. An increase in the level of the Gini index (lagged 1 period) by
one standard deviation raises the likelihood of a banking crisis by 3.81 percentage points. An increase in
the probability of a banking crisis by 3.81 percentage points is economically a large effect given that the
frequency of a crisis episode is only 4.8 percent in the full sample.
Furthermore, the standard deviation is around 0.03 for the average level of the top 1% income share in
the extended model for the full sample, meaning that an increase of one standard deviation in the level of
the top 1% income share raises the probability of a banking crisis by 2.21 percentage points (the frequency
of a crisis is 4.3% in this sample).
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Table 4: Average marginal effects of Gini index and top 1% income share
Baseline Extension
Variable Full sample >50% >75% Full sample >50% >75%
L1.Gini 0.0041*** 0.0058* 0.0131*** 0.0065*** 0.0120** 0.0171***
(0.0014) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0022) (0.0047) (0.0055)
Observations 588 316 168 417 223 117
Countries 33 31 25 28 25 18
Crises 24 16 11 20 14 10
Std. Dev. 3.1269 1.5216 1.2988 3.0268 1.3066 1.0691
L1. Top 1% income 0.4038*** 0.6073*** 0.7452*** 0.6888*** 1.4458*** 2.0375**
(0.1534) (0.2050) (0.2476) (0.2610) (0.3452) (0.9283)
Observations 408 210 119 324 172 95
Countries 19 16 14 18 16 13
Crises 15 8 5 14 8 4
Std. Dev. 0.0190 0.0170 0.0157 0.0191 0.0179 0.0160
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
It could be of interest to examine whether an increase in the level of income inequality depends on the
initial level of inequality. The 50th and 75th percentile for the Gini index and the top 1% income share are
computed based on the full sample in the baseline and extended specification respectively. The standard
deviation is around 3.9 for the Gini index for countries above the 75th percentile in the extended model.
An increase of one standard deviation in the level of the Gini index for countries above the 75th percentile
increases the probability of a crisis by 6.60 percentage points. Consequently, the effect of an increase in the
level of income inequality on the likelihood of crisis is higher if the country already has a high level of income
inequality.
To conclude, the results show that the level of income inequality before taxes and transfers is positively
and significantly associated with banking crises. Moreover, the effect of an increase in the level of income
inequality on the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis is relatively large in economic terms. Finally,
the results suggest that an increase in the level of income inequality has a bigger effect on the probability of
banking crises if the country already has an high level of income inequality.
4.3 Robustness and sensitivity analysis
We now estimate a set of different specifications to test the robustness of the results illustrated in the
previous section. The first issue we consider is whether the results still hold when models include country
fixed effects. One way to check if this is the case amounts to estimating logit regressions with country fixed
effects. However, this procedure implies that the number of available observations in the specifications shown
15
in Tables 2 and 3 drop by at least one third.
Consequently, we include macro-region fixed effects, following Magud and Vesperoni (2015) and Hutchin-
son (2002). These dummy variables control for region-specific unobservable time-invariant characteristics,
and are essentially equivalent to an aggregated form of fixed effects analysis (Magud and Vesperoni, 2015).
Accordingly, the 33 advanced countries in the dataset were divided in six different geographic regions.7
Table 5 shows the estimation results of the baseline and extended specifications including regional dummy
variables and the Gini index. In the baseline model, the Gini coefficient has the expected sign and is significant
at the 10% level for the first and second lag of the Gini index. In comparison to the specifications without
regional dummies, the third lag of the Gini index is no longer significant. All lags of the Gini coefficient are
significant at the 5% level in the extended specification. Finally, the coefficient for the top 1% income share
is significant at the 1% level in both the baseline and extended estimations shown in Table 6.
Similarly to Magud and Vesperoni (2015) as well as Bordo and Meissner (2012), we include yearly dummy
variables to control for unobservable time effects. In the Appendix we show the results for the Gini index
and top 1% income share including both region- and decade- (1980s, 1990s and 2000s) fixed effects. The
estimated coefficient of the Gini index is insignificant for all lags in the baseline specification in Table A4 in
the Appendix. However, the estimated Gini coefficients are positive and significant at the 10% level in the
extended model. Moreover, the coefficient for the top 1% income share is generally highly significant in both
the baseline and extended model shown in Table A5.
Furthermore, to test the robustness of the results for the top 1% income share, we re-estimate the
baseline and extended specification for the top 0.1%, 5% and 10% income shares, including regional fixed
effects. Table A6 in the Appendix shows that the coefficients for top 0.1%, 5% and 10% income shares are
positive and highly significant.
To test whether the significance of the results depends on a specific region, we estimate the extended
model with one lag for the Gini index and the top 1% income share excluding one region at a time. The Gini
index is significant when excluding any of the six different regions shown in Table A7. However, the results
are only significant at the 10% level when excluding North America and Australasia or Western Europe.
Moreover, the coefficient for the top 1% income share is significant under the exclusion of any region with
the exception of North America and Australasia or Western Europe, as shown in Table A8.
Bordo and Meissner (2012) argue that domestic bank credit may not be a a good proxy for total credit
if substantial amounts of credit are provided by non-bank institutions. For example, in the United States
7The 33 countries are divided into the following 6 regions: North America and Australasia (Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the United States), South Europe (Israel, Italy, Portugal and Spain), East and Southeast Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia), Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden),
Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore) and Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
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Table 5: Results for Gini index including regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.172*** −0.170*** −0.171*** −0.371*** −0.386*** −0.390***
(0.0593) (0.0596) (0.0597) (0.0774) (0.0785) (0.0809)
totchange 0.0721*** 0.0721*** 0.0689*** 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.128***
(0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0291)
depreciation −0.0695*** −0.0688*** −0.0689*** −0.0806*** −0.0799*** −0.0782***
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0212)
realinterest 0.0391 0.0494 0.0463 0.123 0.127 0.0865
(0.0843) (0.0863) (0.0861) (0.112) (0.117) (0.148)
inflation 0.0624 0.0700 0.0705 0.0356 0.0438 0.00360
(0.0692) (0.0695) (0.0675) (0.0795) (0.0803) (0.0732)
gdp pc 0.0308*** 0.0308*** 0.0301*** 0.0592*** 0.0613*** 0.0637***
(0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.0208)
d NA Australasia −1.055 −1.047 −1.075 −0.535 −0.508 −0.580
(0.968) (0.973) (0.977) (1.029) (1.033) (0.955)
d South Europe 0.364 0.365 0.355 0.718** 0.760** 0.615
(0.485) (0.501) (0.489) (0.364) (0.379) (0.488)
d East Europe 0.317 0.285 0.260 − − −
(0.964) (0.994) (1.001) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.669 −0.642 −0.706 −0.791 −0.833 −1.121
(0.464) (0.466) (0.478) (0.501) (0.534) (0.752)
d Asia −1.291* −1.286* −1.346* −1.484** −1.584** −1.619**
(0.783) (0.768) (0.752) (0.666) (0.635) (0.651)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
m2 reserves 0.00641 0.00550 0.00196
(0.0197) (0.0216) (0.0249)
credit gdp 0.0109** 0.0122** 0.00958*
(0.00516) (0.00560) (0.00539)
L2.credit growth 0.0441* 0.0455* 4.541
(0.0263) (0.0274) (4.449)
L.gini market 0.0749* 0.161**
(0.0427) (0.0812)
L2.gini market 0.0765* 0.172**
(0.0438) (0.0801)
L3.gini market 0.0661 0.174**
(0.0441) (0.0758)
Observations 588 575 566 403 399 392
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 96.09 96 96.11 96.03 95.99 95.92
% Crises Correct 4.167 8.333 8.333 20 20 20
% No−Crises Correct 100 99.82 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.200 0.199 0.198 0.307 0.310 0.318
Chi−sq 40.16 39.77 39.41 48.81 49.28 50.21
p−value 0.00013 0.00015 0.00017 0.00004 0.00003 0.00002
AIC 186.4 185.7 185.3 140.3 139.4 137.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Results for the top 1% income share including regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.338*** −0.305** −0.324*** −0.308** −0.258** −0.293**
(0.130) (0.133) (0.125) (0.120) (0.130) (0.118)
totchange 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.0897*** 0.0923*** 0.112*** 0.0940***
(0.0201) (0.0181) (0.0325) (0.0205) (0.0239) (0.0337)
depreciation −0.0579*** −0.0653*** −0.0534*** −0.0698*** −0.0805*** −0.0734**
(0.0168) (0.0145) (0.0170) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0302)
realinterest 0.129* 0.125 0.0865 0.187** 0.229* 0.166
(0.0671) (0.0832) (0.0720) (0.0924) (0.135) (0.141)
inflation −0.0349 −0.0216 −0.0932 0.00697 0.0558 0.00295
(0.0790) (0.0891) (0.0827) (0.0926) (0.134) (0.127)
gdp pc 0.0254* 0.0250* 0.0123 0.0343** 0.0393** 0.0252*
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0136)
d NA Australasia −2.227*** −2.363*** −1.960** −1.838** −2.209*** −1.978**
(0.821) (0.777) (0.831) (0.881) (0.819) (0.944)
d South Europe 0.261 0.0578 0.0643 0.472 0.369 0.210
(0.489) (0.514) (0.342) (0.499) (0.565) (0.403)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.154 −0.265 −0.414 0.0515 0.0634 −0.111
(0.439) (0.462) (0.346) (0.505) (0.601) (0.500)
d Asia −2.165*** −2.345*** −2.525*** −1.739** −1.872** −2.071***
(0.750) (0.695) (0.628) (0.746) (0.748) (0.608)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
m2 reserves 0.00597 −0.00863 0.00605
(0.0113) (0.0408) (0.0117)
credit gdp 0.00794 0.00823 0.00533
(0.00655) (0.00881) (0.00689)
L2.credit growth −0.00210 −0.00311 2.118
(0.0268) (0.0319) (4.394)
L.topincomep99 26.53*** 28.68***
(7.930) (9.440)
L2.topincomep99 26.94*** 33.42***
(7.949) (11.19)
L3.topincomep99 15.07*** 23.42***
(5.719) (8.825)
Observations 408 402 392 324 321 317
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.81 96.77 96.43 96.30 96.26 95.90
% Crises Correct 13.33 13.33 6.667 14.29 14.29 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.255 0.267 0.208 0.267 0.290 0.227
Chi−sq 32.84 34.14 26.46 30.77 33.34 26.08
p−value 0.00180 0.00114 0.0147 0.0144 0.00665 0.0529
AIC 119.7 117.9 124.9 114.6 111.7 118.6
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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banks only account for 30% of total credit, while bank credit in countries like Germany or Greece can be
around 90% of total credit (Denbiermont, Drehmann and Muksakunratana, 2013). Table A3 shows that the
median level of total credit as a percentage of GDP is 117% compared to 69% for domestic bank credit.
Consequently, the specifications are re-estimated including a measure for total credit which may also include
cross-border credit and domestic credit from other financial institutions.
Table A9 in the Appendix shows the results for the Gini index and the top 1% income shares including
the broader measure of total credit. Both the Gini index and the top 1% income share (columns 1 and 4) are
highly statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for the level of total credit (as a percentage
of GDP) is positive and significant, while that of the growth rate of total credit is statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) consider aggregate measures of credit that include
both household credit (the relevant type of credit according to the literature) and credit to firms. Moreover,
the average correlation between the real growth rate in firm and household credit is only 40% across countries
(Denbiermont, Drehmann and Muksakunratana, 2013). Columns 2-3 and 5-6 in Table A9 show the results for
estimations including household and firm credit separately. The Gini index and the top 1% income share are
both positive and highly statistically significant when including household or firm credit. Interestingly, both
the level of household credit to GDP and the lagged growth rate of household credit are highly significant in
the specifications that include the Gini index (column 2). However, both the level and growth rate of firm
credit are not significant in any specification (columns 3 and 6). This result is consistent with the findings by
Bu¨yu¨kkarabacak and Valev (2010). Consequently, household credit seems to be more important for financial
stability compared to firm credit.
For the results presented in the previous Section all control variables except credit growth are contem-
poraneous, which may lead to endogeneity issues. To check if the coefficients are influenced by endogeneity
we lag all control variables one period. Table A10 shows that the coefficients for the Gini index are highly
significant when all control variables are lagged one period in the baseline specification. In addition, Table
A11 shows that the significance of the top 1% income share is robust to lagging the control variables one
period.
Among the lagged control variables, the coefficients of GDP per capita and the change in terms of trade
typically remain positive and significant. The level of credit to GDP is highly significant and positive in all
estimations with the Gini index. This finding reinforces the importance of the level of credit to GDP as a
determinant of banking crises.
Interestingly, the coefficient of the growth rate of GDP switches to a positive sign and is highly significant
as shown in Table A10. Consequently, the negative estimated coefficient of contemporaneous GDP growth
shown in Tables 5 and 6 may be a consequence of the onset of the banking crisis rather than a cause of the
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crisis. Furthermore, the coefficient of nominal depreciation is not significant when lagged one period, which
once again may be a consequence of endogeneity. In addition, the real interest rate becomes significant and
positive when lagged one period, contrary to previous results.
Logit estimations with robust standard errors that are not clustered by country are shown in Table
A12. The coefficient estimates for the Gini index in the baseline and extended model remain significant.
Moreover, Table A13 shows that the coefficients for the Gini index are also positive and significant for probit
regressions. In addition, the sign and significance of the critical coefficients seem quite stable with respect
to the omission/inclusion of the additional regressors.
It is important to control for the quality of institutions and market regulations across countries. Estima-
tions including regulation indices from the Fraser Institute in the Economic Freedom of the World database
can be found in the Appendix (see Tables A14-A16). All regulation indexes take values between 0 and
10, and a higher number implies more deregulation. The credit regulation index (code 5A) is a summary
measure of (i) ownership of banks (ii) foreign bank competition (iii) private sector credit and (iv) interest
rates controls/negative interest rates.
Furthermore, it is important to account for the institutional setting of labor and product markets. Labor
market regulation (code 5B) includes information about (i) hiring regulations for temporary workers and
minimum wage, (ii) hiring and firing regulations, (iii) centralized collective bargaining, (iv) hours regulation
and (v) conscription and mandated costs of dismissal. In addition, the business regulation index encompasses
information on (i) price controls, (ii) administrative requirements, (iii) bureaucracy costs, (iv) time and
money required to start a business, (v) extra payments or bribes, (vi) licensing costs and (vii) cost of tax
compliance. These measures have been used previously in the empirical literature for example by Perugini,
Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) and Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2011).
Table A14 reports results from Logit estimations including each regulation index separately and all
together. First, we can see that the coefficients for both the Gini index and the top 1% income share are
positive and significant in all estimations. Second, the business regulation index (business reg) is negative and
highly significant, while the credit regulation index (credit reg) and the labor regulation index (labour reg)
are not. These findings suggest that a more deregulated product market seems to lower the probability of
banking crises. To conclude, the previous finding that the Gini index and top 1% income share are positively
associated with the likelihood of banking crises seems robust with respect to the inclusion of regulation
indices for credit, labor and product markets.
According to Piketty and Saez (2013), a booming stock market both increases top income shares (via
higher capital gains) and enhances financial fragility. Stock market conditions are proxied by a share price
index collected from the OECD database. If the contemporaneous level of the share price index is included,
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its coefficient is insignificant. Moreover, the contemporaneous coefficient for the growth rate of the share
price index is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result is expected since banking crises often
coincide with a collapse in stock prices.
Tables A15 and A16 show results for the top 1% income share when the level and growth rate of the share
price index are lagged one period. The lagged coefficients for both the level and growth rate of the share
price index and the top 1% income share are positive and typically significant. In short, results suggest that
the positive association between the top 1% income share and the likelihood of banking crises previously
found is not simply a correlation caused by a booming stock market.
5 Conclusions
This paper is one of the first to empirically investigate whether the level of income inequality is directly
linked to the occurrence of banking crises. Previous empirical literature examining the “level” hypothesis
either used descriptive statistics (for example Atkinson and Morelli, 2015), or investigated the indirect link
between income inequality and banking crises via the level of credit in the economy (Perugini, Ho¨lscher and
Collie, 2016).
We conduct an econometric analysis based on logit regressions to estimate the relationship between the
level of the Gini index or top 1% income shares (both before taxes and transfers) and banking crises. Using
a panel dataset of 33 advanced countries over the period 1970-2011, we find strong evidence for a positive
association between the probability of banking crises and the level of income inequality. In addition, the
results successfully pass a battery of robustness tests, such as for example the inclusion of the level and
growth rate of domestic bank credit and the exclusion of various groups of countries.
Furthermore, we find that the effect of an increase in the level of inequality on the probability of the
occurrence of a banking crisis is relatively large in economic terms, and that the size of the effect seems to
increase with the level of income inequality.
Although income inequality could influence the probability of a banking crisis through several channels,
to set up a fully-fledged theoretical model supporting our empirical findings goes beyond the scope of this
paper.8
A possible mechanism, consistent with our empirical findings, that links income inequality and banking
crises is the following. Persistently high levels of (before-tax) income inequality may induce policy makers
to increase redistribution through large public expenditure and taxation mechanisms like those pioneered by
Meltzer and Richard (1981), and later extended to growth by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
8With the exception of Kumhof, Ranciere and Winant (2015), we are not aware of theoretical contributions displaying a neat
relationship between income inequality and financial crises. Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016) discuss the literature
and describe some of these channels.
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Tabellini (1994). Worsening public deficits and debts (and rising interest rates), such policies may depress
growth and ultimately deteriorate banks stability.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that almost all biggest economies of our samples display a positive
association between persistently high levels of income inequality and the occurrence of banking crises. Insofar
as high levels of income inequality are associated to banking crises in large economies, inequality should be
taken very seriously at the international level as financial integration might easily give rise to epidemic
contagion worldwide.
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Table A1: Definitions and sources of main variables
Variable Definition Source
crisis A binary variable equal to 1
in the first year of a banking
crisis, 0 otherwise.
Laeven and Valencia (2013).
gini gross Market Gini index pre-tax
and pre-transfer.
Standard World Income Inequality Database
(SWIID) version 5.1.
topincomep99 The income share of top 1%
pre-tax and pre-transfer
World Top Incomes Database.
gdp growth Growth rate of real GDP. World Bank WDI.
totchange Change in terms of trade. World Bank WDI.
realinterest Nominal interest rate minus
contemporaneous inflation.
The nominal interest rate is from IFS: (i) trea-
sure bill rate or (ii) discount/bank rate or (iii)
the deposit rate. The GDP deflator based In-
flation is from World Bank WDI.
inflation Rate of change of GDP defla-
tor.
World Bank WDI.
m2 reserves Ratio of M2 to international
reserves.
M2 (money plus quasi-money in local cur-
rency) that is converted to US$ and divided
by total foreign exchange reserves of the cen-
tral bank. All data is from IMF IFS.
depreciation Rate of depreciation. USD/LCU exchange rate (IMF IFS).
gdp1 pc Real GDP per capita. Constant 1995 in thousands of US$ (World
Bank WDI).
credit gdp Ratio of private sector bank
credit to GDP.
Adjusted domestic bank credit to the private
non-financial sector divided by GDP (BIS to-
tal credit statistics). Otherwise depository
corporations domestic claims on private sector
(IMF IFS) divided by nominal GDP (World
Bank WDI). All in LCU.
credit growth Growth rate of real domestic
bank credit to the private sec-
tor.
Adjusted domestic bank credit to the private
non-financial sector (BIS total credit statis-
tics), otherwise depository corporations do-
mestic claims on private sector (IMF IFS);
divided by the GDP deflator (World Bank
WDI). All in LCU.
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Table A2: Definitions and sources of additional variables used in robustness tests
Variable Definition Source
totalcredit gdp Ratio of private sector total credit to
GDP. This variable includes domes-
tic bank credit, cross-border credit
and domestic credit from other fi-
nancial institutions.
Adjusted total credit to the private non-financial
sector divided by GDP (BIS total credit statis-
tics).
totalcredit growth Growth rate of real total credit to
the private sector. This variable in-
cludes domestic bank credit, cross-
border credit and domestic credit
from other financial institutions.
Adjusted total credit to the private non-financial
sector (BIS total credit statistics); divided by the
GDP deflator (World Bank WDI). All in LCU.
hhcredit gdp Ratio of private sector household
credit to GDP.
Adjusted household credit to the private non-
financial sector divided by GDP (BIS total credit
statistics).
hhcredit growth Growth rate of real household credit
to the private sector.
Adjusted household credit to the private non-
financial sector (BIS total credit statistics); di-
vided by the GDP deflator (World Bank WDI).
All in LCU.
firmcredit gdp Ratio of private sector firm credit to
GDP.
Adjusted firm credit to the private non-financial
sector divided by GDP (BIS total credit statis-
tics).
firmcredit growth Growth rate of real firm credit to the
private sector.
Adjusted firm credit to the private non-financial
sector (BIS total credit statistics); divided by the
GDP deflator (World Bank WDI). All in LCU.
credit reg Credit regulation index taking val-
ues from 0 to 10. A higher number
implies more deregulation.
Economic Freedom of the World database (Fraser
institute).
labor reg Labor market regulation index tak-
ing values from 0 to 10. A higher
number implies more deregulation.
Economic Freedom of the World database (Fraser
institute).
business reg Business regulation index taking
values from 0 to 10. A higher num-
ber implies more deregulation.
Economic Freedom of the World database (Fraser
institute).
house index Real house price index OECD
share index Share price index OECD
topincomep999 The income share of top 0.1% pre-
tax and pre-transfer.
World Top Incomes Database.
topincomep95 The income share of top 5% pre-tax
and pre-transfer.
World Top Incomes Database.
topincomep90 The income share of top 10% pre-tax
and pre-transfer.
World Top Incomes Database.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Bank crisis 0.09 0 0.15 0 1 1386
Market Gini index 43.41 44.20 6.08 24.47 58.59 1040
Top 0.1% income share 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.12 595
Top 1% income share 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.23 662
Top 5% income share 0.21 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.37 665
Top 10% income share 0.32 0.31 0.05 0.19 0.47 659
GDP growth 3.35 3.21 3.41 -14.81 16.16 1217
Change in terms of trade 1.20×1012 0 6.82×1012 -3.26×1013 6.97×1013 1201
Depreciation 7.88 -0.06 257.10 -99.29 7533.67 861
Real interest rate 1.25 1.35 3.97 -19.43 20.11 745
Inflation 7.24 4.02 16.87 -9.69 390.68 1217
GDP per capita 31381.71 29192 16752.88 1960.36 110001.1 1227
Ratio M2 to Inter. Res. 123602.6 66.84 2130872 0.90 4.22×107 623
Credit to GDP 76.58 68.58 34.37 20.7 312.12 1071
Credit growth 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.21 0.60 1032
Total credit to GDP 123.21 117.43 49.51 29.3 421.43 1043
Total credit growth 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.13 0.78 999
Household credit to GDP 50.12 46.89 24.52 5.93 137.95 774
Household credit growth 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.20 0.61 747
Firm credit to GDP 83.73 79.58 36.17 26.13 369.23 752
Firm credit growth 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.15 0.92 730
Credit regulation index 8.72 9.26 1.50 0 10 566
Labour regulation index 5.97 5.7 1.70 2.62 9.46 529
Business regulation index 6.79 6.78 0.92 3.91 9.5 424
Real house price index 75.17 72.18 31.18 24.10 188.54 890
Share price index 66.19 47.82 78.37 0.01 1246.92 947
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Table A4: Results for Gini index including regional and period dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.191*** −0.191*** −0.191*** −0.364*** −0.378*** −0.374***
(0.0664) (0.0663) (0.0663) (0.0794) (0.0800) (0.0818)
totchange 0.0570*** 0.0565*** 0.0546*** 0.141*** 0.144*** 0.143***
(0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0482) (0.0502) (0.0481)
depreciation −0.0661*** −0.0661*** −0.0659*** −0.0832*** −0.0818*** −0.0822***
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0229) (0.0227) (0.0246)
realinterest 0.0352 0.0397 0.0366 0.0470 0.0566 0.0363
(0.0965) (0.0949) (0.0989) (0.187) (0.182) (0.208)
inflation 0.101 0.104 0.103 −0.0653 −0.0553 −0.0559
(0.0769) (0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0939) (0.0963) (0.0978)
gdp pc 0.0227** 0.0228** 0.0225** 0.0671** 0.0681** 0.0661**
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0289)
d NA Australasia −1.012 −1.032 −1.055 −0.333 −0.319 −0.332
(1.073) (1.098) (1.097) (1.050) (1.069) (1.015)
d South Europe 0.106 0.104 0.109 0.885 0.902 0.814
(0.501) (0.514) (0.506) (0.577) (0.570) (0.555)
d East Europe −0.00757 −0.0270 −0.0283 − − −
(0.953) (0.959) (0.955) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.655 −0.644 −0.681 −0.847 −0.880 −0.850
(0.435) (0.450) (0.456) (0.743) (0.783) (0.763)
d Asia −1.363 −1.367 −1.402* −1.685** −1.757** −1.926***
(0.857) (0.846) (0.839) (0.751) (0.715) (0.710)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d 1980s 13.24*** 13.66*** 13.81*** 271.2 290.0 16.15***
(1.235) (1.183) (1.197) (344.9) (378.2) (2.275)
d 1990s 14.91*** 15.34*** 15.38*** 269.6 288.7 14.39***
(1.153) (1.297) (1.252) (344.0) (377.3) (1.172)
d 2000s 14.66*** 15.07*** 15.09*** 269.7 288.7 14.44***
(1.127) (1.253) (1.208) (344.0) (377.3) (0.829)
m2 reserves 0.00170 0.00100 0.00279
(0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0329)
credit gdp 0.0136** 0.0141** 0.0157**
(0.00675) (0.00640) (0.00702)
L2.credit growth 3.393 3.636 2.975
(4.403) (4.831) (4.570)
L.gini market 0.0514 0.203*
(0.0513) (0.108)
L2.gini market 0.0519 0.211*
(0.0523) (0.112)
L3.gini market 0.0459 0.208*
(0.0532) (0.107)
Observations 588 575 566 403 399 392
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 96.26 96.17 96.11 95.78 95.99 95.92
% Crises Correct 8.333 8.333 8.333 20 20 20
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 99.74 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.230 0.229 0.227 0.331 0.333 0.335
Chi−sq 46.17 45.67 45.13 52.69 52.83 52.89
p−value 9.16e−05 0.000110 0.000133 5.22e−05 4.97e−05 4.87e−05
AIC 186.4 185.8 185.5 142.4 141.9 141.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Results for top 1% income share including regional and period dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.335** −0.306** −0.333** −0.304*** −0.253** −0.298**
(0.135) (0.146) (0.149) (0.111) (0.119) (0.131)
totchange 0.0936*** 0.104*** 0.0775** 0.0970*** 0.118*** 0.0827**
(0.0222) (0.0193) (0.0340) (0.0326) (0.0311) (0.0346)
depreciation −0.0550*** −0.0608*** −0.0494*** −0.0684*** −0.0827*** −0.0688**
(0.0158) (0.0145) (0.0163) (0.0239) (0.0230) (0.0273)
realinterest 0.126 0.127 0.109 0.166 0.189 0.176
(0.0854) (0.0967) (0.0999) (0.119) (0.140) (0.137)
inflation −0.0130 0.0111 −0.0250 −0.0492 −0.0179 0.00851
(0.140) (0.148) (0.167) (0.109) (0.132) (0.143)
gdp pc 0.0207 0.0194 0.00718 0.0331* 0.0379** 0.0251*
(0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0145) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0134)
d NA Australasia −2.056*** −2.244*** −1.856* −1.763* −2.203*** −1.652*
(0.759) (0.741) (0.948) (0.901) (0.849) (0.935)
d South Europe 0.271 0.0888 0.0461 0.500 0.407 0.421
(0.566) (0.607) (0.410) (0.600) (0.660) (0.413)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic 0.0139 −0.0503 −0.206 0.0782 0.105 0.164
(0.489) (0.532) (0.288) (0.643) (0.730) (0.492)
d Asia −2.051*** −2.237*** −2.251*** −1.845** −2.036*** −1.992***
(0.719) (0.678) (0.701) (0.731) (0.700) (0.723)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d 1980s 13.62*** 13.10*** 14.94*** 91.41 59.82 24.42*
(1.920) (1.931) (2.668) (471.4) (438.8) (14.52)
d 1990s 14.28*** 13.97*** 16.12*** 90.37 58.58 23.88
(1.115) (1.135) (1.307) (471.1) (438.7) (15.07)
d 2000s 14.19*** 13.74*** 16.11*** 90.76 58.86 24.31
(0.800) (0.872) (1.102) (471.2) (438.8) (15.01)
m2 reserves 0.00855 −0.0248 0.0703
(0.0832) (0.0693) (0.0709)
credit gdp 0.00808 0.00927 0.00764
(0.00888) (0.0109) (0.00702)
L2.credit growth 1.061 0.660 −1.044
(6.023) (5.611) (4.391)
L.topincomep99 24.44*** 28.05***
(7.838) (9.753)
L2.topincomep99 25.91*** 33.96***
(8.567) (12.05)
L3.topincomep99 13.60* 23.31**
(7.107) (9.947)
Observations 408 402 392 324 321 317
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.81 96.77 96.43 96.30 96.26 95.90
% Crises Correct 13.33 13.33 6.667 14.29 14.29 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.266 0.279 0.229 0.281 0.304 0.247
Chi−sq 34.23 35.78 29.12 32.42 34.97 28.31
p−value 0.00506 0.00311 0.0231 0.0280 0.0141 0.0776
AIC 124.3 122.3 114.2 118.9 116.1 122.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6: Results for the top 0.1%, 5% and 10% income shares including regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.296** −0.250*** −0.324*** −0.263** −0.224** −0.298***
(0.144) (0.0943) (0.120) (0.127) (0.0902) (0.114)
totchange 0.0865*** 0.0952*** 0.102*** 0.0776** 0.0921*** 0.101***
(0.0184) (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0328) (0.0174) (0.0215)
depreciation −0.0578*** −0.0573*** −0.0567*** −0.0783** −0.0725*** −0.0675***
(0.0201) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0336) (0.0239) (0.0222)
realinterest 0.150** 0.122* 0.0895 0.241** 0.175* 0.140*
(0.0732) (0.0653) (0.0607) (0.0951) (0.0941) (0.0833)
inflation 0.00115 0.00646 −0.0657 0.0759 0.0426 −0.0353
(0.0843) (0.0780) (0.0770) (0.0846) (0.0822) (0.0967)
gdp pc 0.0166 0.0376** 0.0333* 0.0214 0.0497*** 0.0478**
(0.0119) (0.0173) (0.0182) (0.0160) (0.0179) (0.0209)
d NA Australasia −2.281** −1.738** −1.624** −1.850* −1.478* −1.274
(0.938) (0.739) (0.816) (1.009) (0.837) (0.888)
d South Europe 0.431 0.340 0.181 0.524 0.565 0.494
(0.451) (0.542) (0.555) (0.578) (0.552) (0.600)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.284 −0.423 −0.0113 −0.0507 −0.197 0.264
(0.354) (0.659) (0.477) (0.403) (0.839) (0.640)
d Asia −1.717** −2.099*** −2.623*** −1.233 −1.838*** −2.403***
(0.705) (0.643) (0.625) (0.909) (0.649) (0.665)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
m2 reserves −0.0208 0.00277 0.00692
(0.144) (0.0156) (0.0101)
credit gdp 0.00812 0.00804 0.00721
(0.00787) (0.00902) (0.00758)
L2.credit growth −0.0122 −0.00374 0.0156
(0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0266)
L.topincomep999 47.83*** 49.65***
(14.31) (13.16)
L.topincomep95 16.25*** 20.38**
(5.999) (8.681)
L.topincomep90 12.47** 15.91**
(5.660) (8.006)
Observations 366 410 408 287 326 324
No. crises 13 14 15 12 13 14
% Total Correct 96.72 96.83 96.81 96.17 96.32 96.30
% Crises Correct 7.692 7.143 13.33 8.333 7.692 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.241 0.208 0.234 0.250 0.224 0.249
Chi−sq 27.05 25.41 30.08 24.91 24.44 28.67
p−value 0.0123 0.0204 0.00459 0.0715 0.0804 0.0263
AIC 109.3 120.7 122.5 102.8 114.8 116.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7: Results for Gini index, excluding one region at a time
Excluding
NA-
Australasia
Excluding
South Eu-
rope
Excluding
East Europe
Excluding
Nordic
Excluding
Asia
Excluding
Western
Europe
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.286*** −0.264*** −0.334*** −0.295*** −0.240*** −0.209***
(0.0687) (0.0659) (0.0707) (0.0789) (0.0708) (0.0624)
totchange 0.0689** 0.145*** 0.0883*** 0.0997*** −2.459 0.0813**
(0.0317) (0.0445) (0.0199) (0.0287) (2.838) (0.0325)
depreciation −0.104*** −0.0929*** −0.0853*** −0.0821*** −0.0740*** −0.112***
(0.0253) (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0206) (0.0214) (0.0259)
realinterest 0.0287 0.219*** 0.0851 −0.118 0.0366 0.143
(0.152) (0.0750) (0.105) (0.143) (0.129) (0.151)
inflation 0.00762 0.0535 0.0412 0.0177 −0.0212 0.0595
(0.0545) (0.0646) (0.0544) (0.0975) (0.0692) (0.130)
gdp pc 0.0438** 0.0913*** 0.0491*** 0.0582*** 0.0437*** 0.0470***
(0.0173) (0.0292) (0.0105) (0.0173) (0.0120) (0.00993)
m2 reserves 0.0199 −0.0430 0.0119 0.00781 0.0125 0.0197**
(0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0108) (0.0186) (0.0149) (0.0100)
credit gdp 0.0136** 0.00912 0.0118** 0.0141** 0.0154** 0.00922
(0.00606) (0.00580) (0.00488) (0.00631) (0.00677) (0.00621)
L2.credit growth 0.00611 −0.00959 0.0270 0.0285 1.595 0.0134
(0.0428) (0.598) (0.0196) (0.0193) (3.120) (0.0314)
L.gini market 0.152* 0.246*** 0.177*** 0.232*** 0.212*** 0.185*
(0.0824) (0.0895) (0.0565) (0.0726) (0.0651) (0.112)
Observations 300 378 403 368 322 314
No. crises 18 16 20 17 18 11
% Total Correct 95 97.09 96.28 96.20 95.65 97.13
% Crises Correct 27.78 31.25 25 17.65 22.22 18.18
% No−Crises Correct 99.29 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.302 0.316 0.281 0.284 0.241 0.305
Chi−sq 41.10 41.88 44.68 39.12 33.41 29.09
p−value 1.08e−05 7.87e−06 2.48e−06 2.42e−05 0.000233 0.00120
AIC 117.1 112.6 136.4 120.6 127.4 88.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A8: Results for top 1% income share, excluding one region at a time
Excluding
NA-
Australasia
Excluding
South Eu-
rope
Excluding
East Europe
Excluding
Nordic
Excluding
Asia
Excluding
Western
Europe
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.359*** −0.249** −0.275*** −0.264** −0.273** −0.215*
(0.0973) (0.0981) (0.0913) (0.105) (0.115) (0.123)
totchange 0.0529*** 0.0657*** 0.0583*** 0.0594*** −1.577 0.0631**
(0.0172) (0.0144) (0.0108) (0.0113) (2.333) (0.0291)
depreciation −0.0863*** −0.0720*** −0.0727*** −0.0665*** −0.0478** −0.101***
(0.0311) (0.0244) (0.0224) (0.0222) (0.0227) (0.0306)
realinterest 0.204* 0.182* 0.155 0.0656 0.0932 0.191
(0.106) (0.0978) (0.0998) (0.122) (0.126) (0.136)
inflation 0.0663 0.0138 0.0233 0.0242 −0.0610 0.0189
(0.0690) (0.0974) (0.0863) (0.0901) (0.124) (0.119)
gdp pc 0.0396*** 0.0502*** 0.0426*** 0.0420** 0.0283* 0.0508***
(0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0117) (0.0179) (0.0151) (0.0179)
m2 reserves 0.0108 0.00518 0.00229 0.00368 −0.00716 −0.0291
(0.0613) (0.00964) (0.0101) (0.00978) (0.0248) (0.117)
credit gdp 0.0133 0.0132* 0.0159* 0.0198** 0.0144 0.0168
(0.0105) (0.00801) (0.00826) (0.00994) (0.00881) (0.0165)
L2.credit growth −0.00711 −0.0282 −0.00640 −0.00783 3.268 −0.00916
(0.0250) (0.0809) (0.0198) (0.0183) (4.705) (0.0269)
L.topincomep99 22.56 19.62*** 19.55*** 23.93*** 18.92** 17.22
(19.02) (7.604) (7.405) (9.287) (8.095) (10.79)
Observations 202 299 324 287 251 257
No. crises 12 12 14 12 12 8
% Total Correct 95.05 96.66 96.30 96.52 95.62 96.89
% Crises Correct 16.67 16.67 14.29 16.67 8.333 12.50
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 99.60
Pseudo R−sq 0.246 0.232 0.223 0.238 0.179 0.263
Chi−sq 22.41 23.31 25.74 23.75 17.22 18.71
p−value 0.0131 0.00966 0.00411 0.00828 0.0697 0.0441
AIC 90.62 99.38 111.6 97.93 101.2 74.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A9: Income inequality and different measures of credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.307*** −0.324*** −0.322*** −0.237** −0.279*** −0.251***
(0.0732) (0.0709) (0.0730) (0.101) (0.0982) (0.0846)
totchange 0.0746*** 0.0832*** 0.0748*** 0.0517*** 0.0613*** 0.0472***
(0.0222) (0.0216) (0.0232) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0149)
depreciation −0.0815*** −0.0878*** −0.0844*** −0.0789*** −0.0855*** −0.0898***
(0.0209) (0.0193) (0.0197) (0.0249) (0.0211) (0.0226)
realinterest 0.0557 0.0686 0.0357 0.156 0.128 0.128
(0.122) (0.118) (0.107) (0.104) (0.0903) (0.0862)
inflation 0.0124 −0.0176 −0.0549 0.0191 −0.0521 −0.0563
(0.0640) (0.0704) (0.0683) (0.0926) (0.0804) (0.0948)
gdp pc 0.0243 0.0416*** 0.0386** 0.0302** 0.0437*** 0.0446**
(0.0151) (0.00867) (0.0178) (0.0127) (0.0167) (0.0210)
m2 reserves 0.00626 0.0151* 0.00919 −0.00272 0.00353 0.00192
(0.0206) (0.00904) (0.0136) (0.0228) (0.00845) (0.0117)
totalcredit gdp 0.0105** 0.0193**
(0.00515) (0.00945)
L2.totalcredit growth 0.00926 −0.0110
(0.0170) (0.0173)
hhcredit gdp 0.0283*** 0.0270*
(0.00907) (0.0157)
L2.hhcredit growth 0.0532** 0.0171
(0.0239) (0.0292)
firmcredit gdp 0.00270 0.0156
(0.00592) (0.0101)
L2.firmcredit growth 0.000698 −0.00740
(0.0272) (0.0132)
L.gini market 0.154*** 0.140** 0.132**
(0.0528) (0.0544) (0.0567)
L.topincomep99 17.03*** 9.210** 16.34***
(5.132) (4.068) (6.145)
Observations 409 388 372 324 298 289
No. crises 19 19 19 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.33 95.88 95.70 96.30 95.97 95.85
% Crises Correct 21.05 15.79 15.79 14.29 14.29 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.256 0.271 0.234 0.236 0.241 0.229
Chi−sq 39.39 41.05 35.14 27.20 27.22 25.66
p−value 2.17e−05 1.11e−05 0.000118 0.00242 0.00240 0.00422
AIC 136.3 132.6 136.9 110.2 107.7 108.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A10: Gini index, all control variables are lagged 1 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.260** 0.236** 0.220**
(0.0513) (0.0521) (0.0513) (0.103) (0.0989) (0.0989)
L.totchange 0.0888*** 0.0899*** 0.0872*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.148***
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0176) (0.0374) (0.0395) (0.0391)
L.depreciation −0.0215 −0.0226 −0.0233 −0.0478 −0.0506 −0.0503
(0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0327) (0.0337) (0.0342)
L.realinterest 0.178** 0.181** 0.186** 0.378*** 0.407*** 0.423***
(0.0831) (0.0815) (0.0804) (0.102) (0.120) (0.130)
L.inflation 0.101 0.103 0.110 0.0488 0.0614 0.0742
(0.0729) (0.0733) (0.0718) (0.104) (0.108) (0.109)
L.gdp pc 0.0343*** 0.0345*** 0.0343*** 0.0687** 0.0705** 0.0716**
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0283) (0.0303) (0.0307)
d NA Australasia −1.366 −1.339 −1.323 −0.834 −0.879 −0.807
(1.053) (1.038) (1.022) (1.280) (1.293) (1.220)
d South Europe 0.376 0.340 0.319 1.861*** 1.871*** 1.879***
(0.823) (0.833) (0.829) (0.586) (0.576) (0.566)
d East Europe 0.409 0.443 0.468 − − −
(0.752) (0.751) (0.732) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.539 −0.529 −0.558 −0.706 −0.897 −0.971
(0.525) (0.531) (0.541) (0.549) (0.637) (0.700)
d Asia −2.017 −2.040 −2.032 −2.163* −2.253* −2.293*
(1.250) (1.277) (1.291) (1.243) (1.284) (1.314)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
L.m2 reserves −0.0188 −0.0198 −0.0196
(0.0269) (0.0289) (0.0290)
L.credit gdp 0.0156*** 0.0164*** 0.0168***
(0.00399) (0.00411) (0.00438)
L.credit growth −4.416 −4.813 −4.969
(3.428) (3.650) (3.824)
L.gini market 0.0892** 0.184**
(0.0369) (0.0922)
L2.gini market 0.0939** 0.173**
(0.0378) (0.0874)
L3.gini market 0.0891** 0.172**
(0.0406) (0.0787)
Observations 569 563 550 391 386 379
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 95.96 95.91 95.82 95.65 95.60 95.51
% Crises Correct 4.167 4.167 4.167 15 15 15
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.145 0.147 0.145 0.270 0.272 0.274
Chi−sq 28.92 29.16 28.63 42.60 42.80 42.84
p−value 0.00671 0.00620 0.00739 0.000321 0.000300 0.000296
AIC 196 195.2 194.6 145.3 144.6 143.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A11: Top 1% income share, all control variables are lagged 1 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth 0.0837 0.119 0.112 0.224 0.284** 0.267**
(0.0762) (0.0833) (0.0836) (0.138) (0.130) (0.124)
L.totchange 0.0997*** 0.122*** 0.0808** 0.0998*** 0.126*** 0.0895**
(0.0162) (0.0203) (0.0359) (0.0162) (0.0220) (0.0377)
L.depreciation −0.0261 −0.0217 −0.0298 −0.0363 −0.0324 −0.0356
(0.0342) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0373) (0.0366) (0.0359)
L.realinterest 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.218** 0.462*** 0.426*** 0.418***
(0.0967) (0.0924) (0.0889) (0.150) (0.127) (0.129)
L.inflation 0.0718 0.0972 0.0510 0.172 0.181 0.186
(0.0741) (0.0774) (0.0796) (0.132) (0.125) (0.143)
L.gdp pc 0.0408* 0.0394* 0.0331* 0.0395* 0.0365 0.0350*
(0.0228) (0.0238) (0.0198) (0.0217) (0.0233) (0.0197)
d NA Australasia −2.383*** −2.585*** −2.138*** −1.867** −2.096** −1.929**
(0.725) (0.674) (0.756) (0.877) (0.833) (0.923)
d South Europe 1.012 0.898 1.056** 1.611* 1.425 1.535**
(0.621) (0.669) (0.532) (0.946) (0.960) (0.767)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.715 −0.758 −0.888 0.405 0.372 0.274
(0.890) (0.907) (0.758) (0.846) (0.887) (0.718)
d Asia −2.191** −2.723** −2.377** −2.153** −2.907** −2.614**
(0.933) (1.222) (0.989) (0.911) (1.418) (1.332)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
L.m2 reserves 0.0134 0.00854 0.0125
(0.0146) (0.0183) (0.0127)
L.credit gdp 0.0203* 0.0173 0.0183**
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.00911)
L.credit growth −6.574 −6.676 −6.627
(5.588) (5.405) (5.076)
L.topincomep99 27.09*** 33.02***
(7.588) (9.172)
L2.topincomep99 30.73*** 35.90***
(9.277) (10.78)
L3.topincomep99 20.55** 30.57***
(8.221) (10.77)
Observations 395 392 386 316 314 307
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.20 96.43 96.11 96.20 96.50 95.77
% Crises Correct 0 6.667 0 14.29 21.43 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.192 0.216 0.154 0.235 0.255 0.208
Chi−sq 24.49 27.52 19.56 26.92 29.16 23.71
p−value 0.0269 0.0106 0.107 0.0423 0.0229 0.0961
AIC 127.1 123.8 131.3 117.7 115.3 120.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37
Table A12: Logit results for income inequality, robust S.E. (not clustered by country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.181*** −0.265*** −0.324*** −0.308*** −0.275*** −0.279***
(0.0508) (0.0579) (0.0718) (0.0953) (0.0881) (0.0967)
totchange 0.0622*** 0.0845*** 0.0832*** 0.0630*** 0.0583*** 0.0613***
(0.0171) (0.0254) (0.0286) (0.0177) (0.0192) (0.0206)
depreciation −0.0739*** −0.0885*** −0.0878*** −0.0689*** −0.0727*** −0.0855***
(0.0178) (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0193) (0.0213)
realinterest 0.0306 0.0616 0.0686 0.0823 0.155 0.128
(0.0766) (0.121) (0.128) (0.0859) (0.117) (0.123)
inflation 0.0664 0.0311 −0.0176 −0.0692 0.0233 −0.0521
(0.0663) (0.0751) (0.0923) (0.0840) (0.101) (0.0996)
gdp pc 0.0293*** 0.0500*** 0.0416*** 0.0369** 0.0426** 0.0437**
(0.00989) (0.0153) (0.0140) (0.0147) (0.0180) (0.0190)
m2 reserves 0.0107 0.0151* 0.00229 0.00353
(0.0140) (0.00866) (0.0101) (0.00894)
credit gdp 0.0123** 0.0159
(0.00618) (0.0122)
L2.credit growth 0.0175 −0.00640
(0.0228) (0.0218)
hhcredit gdp 0.0283** 0.0270
(0.0137) (0.0189)
L2.hhcredit growth 0.0532* 0.0171
(0.0278) (0.0323)
L.gini market 0.118** 0.180** 0.140*
(0.0471) (0.0713) (0.0792)
L.topincomep99 12.82 19.55* 9.210
(8.785) (11.77) (7.648)
Observations 588 417 388 408 324 298
No. crises 24 20 19 15 14 14
% Total Correct 96.09 96.40 95.88 96.57 96.30 95.97
% Crises Correct 8.333 25 15.79 6.667 14.29 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 99.82 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.178 0.275 0.271 0.195 0.223 0.241
Chi−sq 35.72 44.16 41.05 25.04 25.74 27.22
p−value 8.20e−06 3.08e−06 1.11e−05 0.000748 0.00411 0.00240
AIC 180.8 138.4 132.6 119.5 111.6 107.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A13: Probit results for income inequality, robust S.E. (not clustered by country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.0946*** −0.140*** −0.171*** −0.156*** −0.139*** −0.145***
(0.0272) (0.0353) (0.0445) (0.0507) (0.0493) (0.0539)
totchange 0.0309*** 0.0432*** 0.0402*** 0.0321*** 0.0295*** 0.0302***
(0.00904) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0105)
depreciation −0.0356*** −0.0451*** −0.0471*** −0.0325*** −0.0381*** −0.0458***
(0.00882) (0.0101) (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.00956) (0.0110)
realinterest 0.0263 0.0508 0.0425 0.0427 0.0868 0.0669
(0.0357) (0.0534) (0.0582) (0.0399) (0.0552) (0.0561)
inflation 0.0398 0.0215 −0.00898 −0.0258 0.0137 −0.0236
(0.0301) (0.0369) (0.0423) (0.0390) (0.0450) (0.0444)
gdp pc 0.0147*** 0.0269*** 0.0212*** 0.0186** 0.0221** 0.0214**
(0.00529) (0.00778) (0.00759) (0.00769) (0.00914) (0.00992)
m2 reserves 0.00584 0.00769 0.00111 0.00159
(0.00591) (0.00482) (0.00416) (0.00395)
credit gdp 0.00575* 0.00739
(0.00311) (0.00537)
L2.credit growth 0.0123 −8.97e−05
(0.00899) (0.00891)
hhcredit gdp 0.0144** 0.0133
(0.00654) (0.00863)
L2.hhcredit growth 0.0294** 0.0138
(0.0122) (0.0123)
L.gini market 0.0560*** 0.0857** 0.0630*
(0.0212) (0.0343) (0.0359)
L.topincomep99 6.244 9.160* 4.913
(4.122) (5.161) (3.778)
Observations 588 417 388 408 324 298
No. crises 24 20 19 15 14 14
% Total Correct 96.26 96.16 95.62 96.57 96.30 95.97
% Crises Correct 8.333 20 15.79 6.667 14.29 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 99.73 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.181 0.275 0.274 0.197 0.224 0.244
Chi−sq 36.29 44.12 41.52 25.36 25.90 27.60
p−value 6.39e−06 3.14e−06 9.13e−06 0.000656 0.00388 0.00209
AIC 180.3 138.4 132.2 119.2 111.5 107.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A14: Extended estimation including credit, labor and business regulation indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.252*** −0.254*** −0.271*** −0.301*** −0.316*** −0.310*** −0.301*** −0.302***
(0.0607) (0.0648) (0.0710) (0.0792) (0.0848) (0.0822) (0.112) (0.113)
totchange −0.0754 −0.0761 −0.0792 −0.126** −0.00322 0.0127 −0.0194 −0.0338
(0.0498) (0.0557) (0.0529) (0.0564) (0.0327) (0.0255) (0.0367) (0.0404)
depreciation −0.0872*** −0.0907*** −0.107*** −0.114*** −0.0705*** −0.0696*** −0.0814** −0.0817***
(0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0287) (0.0273) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0319) (0.0296)
realinterest −0.0536 −0.00458 −0.00581 0.0133 0.141 0.129 0.317 0.343
(0.135) (0.111) (0.137) (0.179) (0.120) (0.124) (0.246) (0.239)
inflation −0.0907 −0.0430 −0.0728 −0.0179 0.0170 −0.00247 0.136 0.174
(0.137) (0.115) (0.152) (0.190) (0.123) (0.133) (0.275) (0.265)
gdp pc 0.0529*** 0.0520*** 0.0674*** 0.0739*** 0.0419*** 0.0395** 0.0561** 0.0578**
(0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0161) (0.0180) (0.0229) (0.0226)
credit gdp 0.0138** 0.0134** 0.0197*** 0.0202*** 0.0251* 0.0249* 0.0305** 0.0311**
(0.00631) (0.00654) (0.00744) (0.00718) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0131)
L2.credit growth 4.506 3.926 3.984 3.567 3.724 3.523 −1.194 −1.448
(2.829) (2.720) (3.191) (4.093) (4.816) (4.441) (4.827) (5.351)
credit reg −0.346 0.0308 −0.279 −0.0837
(0.295) (0.382) (0.450) (0.440)
labor reg 0.00596 0.335* −0.122 0.120
(0.149) (0.178) (0.176) (0.242)
business reg −1.299*** −1.681*** −1.485*** −1.597***
(0.302) (0.454) (0.475) (0.542)
L.gini market 0.218** 0.236*** 0.251** 0.288**
(0.0848) (0.0805) (0.102) (0.127)
L.topincomep99 27.17** 28.86** 32.30*** 30.48***
(10.62) (12.01) (8.676) (10.19)
Observations 304 297 270 270 212 204 179 179
No. crises 16 16 16 16 10 10 10 10
% Total Correct 95.39 95.62 95.19 94.81 95.75 95.59 94.97 94.97
% Crises Correct 18.75 25 25 18.75 10 10 10 10
% No−Crises Correct 99.65 99.64 99.61 99.61 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.287 0.276 0.327 0.344 0.259 0.253 0.298 0.301
Chi−sq 36.04 34.39 39.69 41.78 20.88 20.19 23.02 23.22
p−value 8.30e−05 0.000159 1.92e−05 3.63e−05 0.0220 0.0275 0.0107 0.0259
AIC 111.3 112.2 103.8 105.7 81.73 81.62 76.11 79.91
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A15: Estimation with the top 1% income share including the share price index (level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth 0.0102 0.0457 0.0159 −0.0581 −0.00603 0.0387
(0.0878) (0.0915) (0.0910) (0.138) (0.142) (0.130)
L.totchange 0.0648*** 0.0732*** −0.0721* 0.150*** 0.181*** 0.101*
(0.0171) (0.0198) (0.0413) (0.0358) (0.0400) (0.0528)
L.depreciation −0.0265 −0.0260 −0.0240 −0.0142 −0.0114 −0.0207
(0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0253) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0299)
L.realinterest 0.303*** 0.308*** 0.248*** 0.405*** 0.415*** 0.315***
(0.0811) (0.0767) (0.0804) (0.116) (0.104) (0.0843)
L.inflation 0.210** 0.221** 0.181* 0.259* 0.268** 0.229*
(0.0913) (0.0876) (0.0945) (0.139) (0.121) (0.121)
L.gdp pc 0.0412*** 0.0412*** 0.0266** 0.0218 0.0178 0.0118
(0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0133)
L.credit gdp 0.0207* 0.0207** 0.0182** 0.0202* 0.0186* 0.0175*
(0.0107) (0.0105) (0.00909) (0.0110) (0.00960) (0.00894)
L2.credit growth −1.540 −1.669 −5.872 −7.285 −7.388 −8.269
(4.757) (4.515) (6.047) (5.286) (4.905) (5.720)
L.share index 0.00990* 0.00950 0.0176** 0.0204*** 0.0212*** 0.0207***
(0.00585) (0.00600) (0.00712) (0.00771) (0.00821) (0.00713)
d NA Australasia −1.533 −1.691* −1.274
(0.971) (0.902) (0.999)
d South Europe 0.718 0.493 0.685
(0.588) (0.648) (0.547)
d East Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
d Nordic 1.213 1.152* 0.919*
(0.746) (0.650) (0.506)
d Asia −3.961*** −4.709*** −3.442***
(1.286) (1.519) (1.217)
d Western Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
L.topincomep99 18.51*** 30.09***
(7.117) (11.15)
L2.topincomep99 20.22** 31.79***
(8.835) (10.97)
L3.topincomep99 11.52 20.67*
(8.438) (10.66)
Observations 340 339 335 340 339 335
No. crises 15 15 15 15 15 15
% Total Correct 95.88 95.87 95.52 95.59 95.87 95.52
% Crises Correct 6.667 6.667 6.667 6.667 13.33 6.667
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69
Pseudo R−sq 0.186 0.197 0.182 0.269 0.292 0.241
Chi−sq 22.92 24.17 22.35 33.12 35.84 29.52
p−value 0.0110 0.00717 0.0134 0.00711 0.00304 0.0206
AIC 122 120.7 122.2 119.8 117 123
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A16: Estimation with the top 1% income share including the share price index (growth rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth −0.0240 −0.0115 −0.0267 0.0105 0.0319 0.0290
(0.102) (0.0972) (0.0970) (0.123) (0.119) (0.116)
L.totchange 0.0697*** 0.0812*** −0.000384 0.0958*** 0.117*** 0.0417
(0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0344) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0430)
L.depreciation −0.0287 −0.0301 −0.0312 −0.0271 −0.0244 −0.0327
(0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0312) (0.0329) (0.0331) (0.0344)
L.realinterest 0.328*** 0.339*** 0.248*** 0.428*** 0.421*** 0.339***
(0.0982) (0.0958) (0.0845) (0.114) (0.0949) (0.0923)
L.inflation 0.135 0.152 0.0601 0.172 0.184* 0.131
(0.112) (0.104) (0.115) (0.121) (0.104) (0.111)
L.gdp pc 0.0386*** 0.0412*** 0.0232* 0.0335* 0.0306 0.0249
(0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0186) (0.0213) (0.0181)
L.credit gdp 0.0282*** 0.0285*** 0.0270*** 0.0208 0.0189 0.0175*
(0.00982) (0.00907) (0.00894) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0101)
L2.credit growth 2.967 2.635 2.902 1.085 1.406 1.336
(3.758) (3.509) (3.576) (3.807) (3.132) (3.433)
L.share index growth 2.138* 2.480** 3.010** 1.800 2.145* 2.351
(1.199) (1.264) (1.478) (1.389) (1.301) (1.441)
d NA Australasia −1.926** −2.173** −1.758*
(0.925) (0.873) (0.902)
d South Europe 0.937 0.679 0.842
(0.917) (0.971) (0.711)
d East Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
d Nordic 0.174 0.128 −0.178
(0.971) (0.991) (0.769)
d Asia −1.428** −2.047* −1.142***
(0.596) (1.068) (0.408)
d Western Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
L.topincomep99 24.34*** 34.16***
(6.465) (9.450)
L2.topincomep99 27.18*** 37.68***
(7.574) (10.06)
L3.topincomep99 20.89*** 27.62***
(8.035) (9.833)
Observations 337 336 332 337 336 332
No. crises 15 15 15 15 15 15
% Total Correct 95.85 96.13 95.78 95.85 96.43 96.08
% Crises Correct 6.667 13.33 6.667 6.667 20 13.33
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.173 0.189 0.149 0.222 0.246 0.192
Chi−sq 21.20 23.21 18.24 27.25 30.19 23.48
p−value 0.0197 0.00999 0.0510 0.0388 0.0170 0.102
AIC 123.5 121.4 126 125.4 122.4 128.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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